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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a discussion on whistle-blowing and take the view that whistle-blowing is an important fraud detection 
technique. A discussion of some factors that influence the whistle-blowers’ incentive to blow the whistle or to remain silent in 
the face of persuasive fraud red flags, is also presented. The paper suggests that the tradeoff between the cost and benefit of 
whistle-blowing may compel the whistle-blower to apply some degree of conservatism in their whistle-blowing activities. Also, 
some discussion on how whistle-blowing might be influenced by firm-level politics, country-level political economy, firm 
ownership and other institutional factors is presented. Finally, although the provision of incentives can increase the appeal to 
encourage whistle-blowing, the appeal to blow the whistle may be weakened when the whistle-blower takes into account the 
larger context that influence the decision to blow the whistle or to remain silent. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a discussion on whistle-blowing. The paper discuss some factors that influence 
the potential whistle-blower’s incentive to blow the whistle or to remain silent in the face of persuasive fraud red flags. 
After persuasive red flags of fraud have been identified in firms’ financial and non-financial records through the help of 
forensic accounting techniques and the expertise of forensic investigators, it can be difficult sometimes to associate fraud 
red flags with a personality behind the fraud in the sense that there is a human agent behind every fraudulent behavior. 
This difficulty in recent times has led to the need for whistle-blowers to emerge to support on-going fraud investigation 
activities.  
Researchers and professionals, alike, identify whistle-blowers as the most important source of fraud detection 
(ACFE, 2016). Regulators and firms can save substantial resources that would go into fraud investigation if whistle-
blowers emerge early enough and quite often. However, whistle-blowing brings some benefits and costs to the whistle-
blower, and potential whistle-blowers may consider the cost and benefit of whistle-blowing before doing so, and will also 
face the choice of whether to remain silent or to blow the whistle. In this paper, we suggest that the cost-benefit trade-off 
might motivate whistle-blowers to apply greater (or less) conservatism in whistle-blowing. Also, this paper discuss the 
influence of some institutional factors, politics, political economy and firm ownership structure on whistle-blowers’ 
incentive to blow the whistle or to remain silent. We make some propositions and conclude that certain firm-level, political 
and institutional factors can influence a whistle-blower’s incentive to expose fraud. 
Forensic accounting practices or activities can aid any fraud detection activity where records of financial and non-
financial contractual transactions between two or more parties are kept. After persuasive red flags of fraud have been 
identified through the use forensic accounting techniques as well as the expertise of forensic investigators, the next step 
is to associate fraud red flags with a personality in the sense that there is a human agent behind a fraudulent behavior 
(Ozili, 2015). Forensic accounting fails at this point because, at best, forensic accounting techniques can help forensic 
investigators trace fraud to one or more units or departments in an organization responsible for specific roles but it may 
not expose the personality behind fraud. While forensic accounting-based fraud detection techniques on its own may not 
effectively identify fraud perpetrators simply by tracing red flags of fraud, whistle-blowing is more effective to find a 
personality behind fraudulent behaviour.  
Also, there is often a good case to employ word-of-mouth confessions and testimonials before a court of law as 
techniques to detect fraud. However, word-of-mouth confessions and testimonials have some demerits. The main 
drawback is that it can give rise to conflicting truths even when the truth is obvious which then complicates the fraud 
detection process. For instance, speaking to the accountant: did you know that the bank manger gave loans to ghost 
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borrowers? Did you know about the cover-up and when did you know it? This kind of questions require the accountant to 
admit that the bank has ghost borrowers, and that the accountant knew that loan was borrowed to ghost borrowers, and 
that the accountant is fully aware of this behavior when in fact the accountant may not be aware of any ghost borrower. 
This kind of situation creates an ethical dilemma for people testifying in fraud cases because they do not want to implicate 
themselves. To avoid this kind of complications during a fraud detection process, this paper takes the view that whistle-
blowing saves time, cost and resources that would have been channeled to fraud investigation using traditional fraud 
detection techniques. While there are moral justifications to rationalize the need for whistle-blowing as a better fraud 
detection and/or deterrent of fraudulent behavior, this study also highlights some issues associated with whistle-blowing 
activities, precisely, institutional and political economy influences - an issue that has not been discussed in prior study. 
The methodology we adopt in this paper is a systematic review of the extant literature on whistle-blowing.  
Finally, this paper contributes to the whistle-blowing literature by applying ideas from politics and political economy 
to examine the impact of politics on whistle-blowing. By applying a political economy approach, first, we can gain some 
insights to understand why whistle-blowing may be problematic and filled with nervous feelings rather than encouraging 
individuals and employees to boldly blow the whistle to expose fraud perpetrators. Two, it can help us to understand why 
some countries have more number of recorded whistle-blowers while other countries have fewer or no recorded whistle-
blowers. Three, political economy approach can give us some clue as to when and why one can expect the trend in 
whistle-blowing to change over time. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework on whistle-
blowing. Section 3 discuss some motivations for whistle-blowing. Section 4 presents some discussion on conservative 
whistle-blowing, and institutional influence on conservative whistle-blowing. Section 5 discuss the influence of politics on 
whistle-blowing. Section 6 provides some discussion on firm ownership. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Whistleblowing: Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
When certain individuals have knowledge of the truth and feel they have a moral obligation to undo falsehood whether it 
is deliberate or accidental, such individuals will report such falsehood. In this sense, such individuals are referred to as 
‘whistle-blowers’. Simply put, whistle-blowing refers to: calling attention to fraud or concealed information when such 
information is harmful to the welfare of others (Westin, 1982). Whistle-blowing is the disclosure of "illegal, immoral, or 
illegitimate practices to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action." (Near and Miceli, 1988: p.5). The 
recipient of whistle-blowing are either internal parties in the organization (for example, internal auditors)1 or external 
parties (for example, industry regulators, courts of law, etc.); therefore, whistle-blowers can choose to report fraud to 
internal or external parties or both. With respect to an organization and its environment, whistle-blowers may be internal 
(i.e., members of the organization) or external to the organization. Internal whistle-blowers are usually more aware of, and 
are affected by fraudulent and unethical behavior of the organization but may be more afraid of the consequences of 
blowing the whistle, particularly, the loss of job. On the other hand, whistle-blowers may be external to an organization. 
External whistle-blowers do not face serious consequences or fear for blowing the whistle; however, external whistle-
blowers often may not be aware of the extent of unethical/fraudulent behavior in the organization because they are 
external to the organization (Read and Rama, 2003). Moreover, four conditions needs to be fulfilled for an individual to be 
termed a whistle-blower. The individual (i) must be a member of an organization or be part of a system that intentionally 
or unintentionally allow/permit a fraud culture or unethical behavior to go unchecked (ii) must be in a position where they 
are privy to private information, e.g., financial and non-financial records of the firm (iii) must have strong motivation to 
expose fraudulent and/or unethical behavior or practices; and (iv) report such behavior to the relevant authority or to the 
general public through media sources if the whistle-blower has reasons to believe that the relevant authority will ignore 
the claims made to it.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 (Ponemon, 1994; Hooks et al., 1994). 
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3. Motivations to Blow or Not to Blow the Whistle 
 
Why Do Individuals/Employees Blow the Whistle? The motivation for individuals and firms to blow the whistle against 
fraud are diverse. Individuals may blow the whistle because of their personality traits, religiosity, ideology, cultural and 
societal values, etc., the list is not exhaustive. The propensity to blow the whistle against fraud red flags is common 
among individuals with strong value orientation and personality traits (Park et al, 2014), strong moral reasoning 
(Liyanarachchi and Newdick, 2009), high religiosity and ethical ideology (Barnett et al, 1996), strong dissatisfaction with 
injustice, power distance, gender inequality and gender gap (Curtis et al, 2012), etc. Other motivations to blow the whistle 
against fraudulent/unethical behavior are related to workplace issues. For example, the unfair treatment of employees 
from diverse backgrounds is one example. Employees that feel they are not treated with fairness are more likely to blow 
the whistle when they detect fraudulent practices that have a direct impact on the fairness they deserve. In some cases, 
employees may blow the whistle as payback or revenge in response to events in the workplace. To illustrate, a good 
example in this case are employees that blow the whistle against the unethical behavior of the line manager as revenge 
for not giving them (the employees) the promotion they deserve. Employees may deliberately report the line manager to a 
top management member that do not have a good relationship with the line manager. Also, employees may blow the 
whistle against an organization when the activities of the organization switch from being legal (and ethical) to illegal (and 
unethical). While the motivation to blow the whistle vary depending on the context, the pressure for employees to blow 
the whistle is strongest when there is strong organizational support2 for whistle-blowers, and also when the whistle-blower 
knows that he/she will not gain or benefit from the fraudulent/ethical behavior of organizational actors. 
However, there are situations where the potential whistle-blower may prefer to remain silent for various reasons. 
The decision of potential whistle-blowers to remain silent even where there are persuasive red flags of fraud is 
organizations is not surprising for obvious reasons. One, employees who have a fiduciary duty of care and loyalty to their 
organization may have weak incentives to blow the whistle and would rather prefer to remain silent or risk losing their jobs 
due to disloyalty to the organization (Vera-Munoz, 2005). Two, individuals and employees will prefer to remain silent 
when there are obvious fraud red flags if anonymous reporting is not permissible within the organization. Today, many 
modern organizations in advanced and primitive economies have very little scope for anonymous reporting, which partly 
explains why there are few whistle-blowers. Three, employees in firms that have a history of providing little or no support 
to whistle-blowers are more likely to remain silent even in the presence of obvious red flags of fraud. Four, potential 
whistler-blowers in organizations can choose to remain silent about persuasive fraud red flags when they feel that the 
organization has a specialized internal audit and control unit, and expect the internal audit and control unit to detect those 
fraud red flags themselves. 
Financial incentive to whistle-blowers is another source of motivation to encourage whistle-blowing. The impact of 
financial incentives on whistle-blowing to an internal or external authority is not clearly understood in the literature (Pope 
and Lee, 2013). For instance, Dyck et al (2010), after examining accounting and non-accounting fraud cases in the US 
during the 1996 to 2004 period, conclude that monetary incentives for fraud revelation appear to play a role in corporate 
whistle-blowing. Feldman and Lobel (2010) find a significant association between financial incentives and the perceived 
severity of organizational misconduct. However, they observe that those who view the misconduct to be less-severe were 
likely to be influenced by financial incentives to report the misconduct. Andon et al (2016) investigate whether the 
provision of financial incentives and the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing encourage whistle-blowers to blow the 
whistle to a relevant external authority. They took an experiment involving professional accountants as participants, and 
find that the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing leads to greater intention to blow the whistle to a relevant external 
authority regardless of the presence of a financial incentive. However, they observe that the presence of a financial 
incentive increases the intention to blow the whistle even when the perceived seriousness of the financial reporting fraud 
is low. While an understanding of the effectiveness of financial incentives in promoting whistle-blowing is important, it is 
needful to apply caution when advocating for financial incentives to whistle-blowers because the provision of financial 
incentives to whistle-blowers can lead to two effects. On the positive side, financial incentives can encourage whistle-
blowers to report financial reporting fraud when there are available financial incentives. On the negative side, the 
presence of financial incentives can lead to fraud-hunting against managers by potential whistle-blowers (or employees) 
in the sense that any financial reporting irregularity might be reported as fraud when it is not fraud in some cases. 
                                                            
2  King III (1999) suggests that an organization’s structure can play a significant role in the decision to report versus not report 
wrongdoing. 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
                                   Vol 5 No 3 
                            November 2016 
 
 20 
4. Conservatism and Whistle-blowing 
 
Conservatism in whistle-blowing occur when the potential whistle-blower undertakes some degree of verification to 
determine whether fraud red flags are actual fraud, and to determine the intent for committing fraud before reporting the 
fraudulent act. Conservatism in whistle-blowing helps the whistle-blower to ascertain whether there is an underlying moral 
intent behind the fraudulent act even though the act is clearly fraudulent, illegal, unethical, unfair or misleading to others, 
the community and society. The information obtained by the potential whistle-blower during the verification process will 
help the potential whistle-blower make a decision on whether to blow the whistle or to remain silent. If the potential 
whistle-blower proceeds to blow the whistle after obtaining some verification, such individual/employee/company is 
referred to as a conservative whistle-blower. On the other hand, an aggressive whistle-blower is an individual or 
organization that do not obtain any form of verification about fraud red flags and the intent behind fraudulent behavior 
before reporting to the relevant authority. It is important to stress at this point that conservative whistle-blowing is not the 
same as the fear of blowing the whistle. Rather, conservative whistle-blowing is an attempt to avoid making false fraud 
allegations by obtaining some understanding or information about the intent behind fraudulent/unethical behavior which in 
turn helps the potential whistle-blower to decide whether to blow the whistle or to remain silent in certain situations. 
Let’s take the case of a bank as a good example. Consider the case of a potential whistle-blower, who is also a 
bank employee, who is ‘aware’ and ‘understand’ that the bank intend to use accounting techniques to manipulate profit in 
order to artificially increase the level of profit in the short term because the bank realized substantial losses due to 
massive loan defaults arising from bad economic conditions. If the employee blow the whistle against this manipulation of 
bank profit without having prior knowledge of the circumstance that led the bank to engage in such behavior, then the 
employee is an aggressive whistle-blower. On the other hand, the employee is less likely to blow the whistle if he/she 
understand that the fraudulent behavior (i.e. profit manipulation) of the bank during that period is to ensure that the bank 
remain a going concern in the short term in the face of massive losses that threatens the bank’s survival during bad 
economic periods. However, if the employee has this knowledge and still proceeds to blow the whistle, then the employee 
is a conservative whistle-blower.  
If the potential whistle-blower (or bank employee) feel that all fraud red flags points to actual fraud, the employee 
will blow the whistle without engaging in any verification process. When this is the case, the employee is an aggressive 
whistle blower. On the other hand, if the potential whistle-blower (or bank employee) understand that not all fraud red 
flags points to actual fraud, the employee will engage in some verification activity before blowing the whistle, thus, making 
such employee a conservative whistle-blower. In either case, I reiterate that conservative whistle-blowing is not the same 
as the fear of blowing the whistle, rather it is an attempt by the potential whistle-blower to understand whether fraud red 
flags points to actual fraud or whether they point to justifiable financial and non-financial irregularities.  
While conservatism in whistle-blowing may be criticized because it delays the reporting of fraud red flags and also 
discourages potential whistle-blowers from reporting fraud if they find an underlying moral intent to justify the fraud, 
however, the verification required in conservative whistle-blowing is rather intended to reduce the risk of whistle-blowers 
becoming targets and victims of their own actions especially when whistle-blowers report false red flags of fraud and also 
when they do not take into account the context that leads to unethical or fraudulent behavior. Furthermore, aggressive 
whistle-blowing in public corporations is rare because employees in public corporations, while serving public interest, 
have a duty to preserve the integrity of the local, state or federal government which the public corporation represents 
(Brewer and Selden, 1998; Lavena, 2016). In this sense, conservative whistle-blowing is likely to be more common in 
public corporations because employees in public corporations understand what constitute actual fraud, and are more 
privy to private information in public corporations to ascertain whether financial and non-financial reporting irregularities 
constitute fraud. Employees’ access to private information in public corporations and the need to preserve the integrity of 
the local, state or federal government which the public corporation represents combine together to encourage more 
conservative whistle-blowing in public corporations, which in most cases leads to no incidence of whistle-blowing in many 
public corporations. On the other hand, potential whistle-blowers in private companies are less privy to private information 
that could help them verify whether fraud red flags points to actual fraud. Hence, there will be less conservative whistle-
blowing in private companies. The relative lack of access to private information by employees or potential whistle blowers 
in private companies makes it difficult for potential whistle-blowers to obtain information to understand the intent behind 
any observed unethical or fraudulent practice, thus, providing little scope to verify fraud red flags. In this sense, whistle-
blowers in private firms tend to be aggressive whistle-blowers. In a nutshell, conservatism plays an important role in 
whistle-blowing. 
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4.1 Institutional Influence on Conservative Whistle Blowing 
 
4.1.1 Legal/Judicial System 
 
The quality of a country’s legal/judicial system can provide strong incentive or disincentive to blow the whistle against 
unethical and fraudulent practices in organizations. Potential whistle-blowers in environments with strong (or high quality) 
legal systems are more likely to blow the whistle because they trust the judicial system to hold fraudsters accountable. In 
this sense, countries with strong legal/judicial system should have more incidence of whistle-blowing compared to 
countries or environments with weak (or low quality) legal/judicial systems. On the other hand, a strong legal/judicial 
system could also increase the litigation cost that whistle-blowers might face if they report false fraud red flags. If fraud 
red flags are false, the accused person(s) or organizations can file libel charges and other compensation against the 
whistle-blower. For this reason, potential whistle-blowers in environments with strong legal systems will be cautious and 
engage in conservative whistle-blowing activities in order to avoid litigation risks and related consequences arising from 
falsely blowing the whistle against suspected fraud red flags that aren’t true. In this sense, conservative whistle-blowing 
can be expected in countries with strong legal/judicial systems. 
 
4.1.2 Securities Law 
 
In securities market, existing securities laws can also influence conservatism in whistle-blowing. While it is true that the 
nature, structure and efficacy of securities laws vary widely across countries (La Porta et al, 2003), securities law are put 
in place to elicit good behavior from the issuers and users of capital in financial markets. Normally, securities law should 
lower the cost of private contracting by standardizing securities contracts, and should clarify liability rules to prevent false 
and misleading disclosures to investors. However, securities law by itself cannot elicit good behavior from securities 
market participants without an enforcer, hence, the need for a securities law enforcer like the SEC. Securities law 
enforcers ensure that corporate disclosures to investors are reliable and relevant for decision making by investor. In 
principle, the securities law enforcer (i) should be free from political interference, (ii) should be able to commit additional 
resources to verify corporate disclosures, and (iii) should have investigative powers and should be able to impose non-
criminal and criminal sanctions on fraudulent behavior in securities markets. When this is the case, countries with a 
strong securities law enforcer will have a regulatory environment that discourage fraudulent behavior among securities 
market participants which in turn creates an environment that encourage aggressive whistle-blowing rather than 
conservative whistle-blowing because potential whistle-blowers can quickly report fraud red flags to the enforcer while 
allowing the securities law enforcer to bear the responsibility for verifying fraud allegations made to it by whistle-blowers. 
The presence of a strong securities market enforcer will reduce the incentive for whistle-blowers to verify whether fraud 
red flags point to actual fraud. Therefore, one would expect less conservative (i.e., more aggressive) whistle-blowing in 
countries with a securities law enforcer that have substantial verification, investigative and prosecutorial powers. For 
example, the US and UK SEC have substantial verification, investigative and prosecutorial powers. Conversely, 
conservatism in whistle-blowing is expected to be pronounced in environments with no securities law enforcer and in 
environments where the securities law enforcer has weak verification, investigative and prosecutorial powers because 
potential whistle-blowers will have to bear much of the responsibility to prove that their allegations for suspected fraud red 
flags are true. Also, in the absence of a securities law enforcer, there will be greater demand for verifiable information in 
securities and financial markets, and fraud allegations made by whistle-blowers might not be taken seriously due to doubt 
about whether such allegations are true. In this case, whistle-blowers in listed companies are more likely to be 
conservative in their whistle-blowing activities. 
 
5. Politics and Whistle Blowing 
 
Politics also play a significant role in the outcome of whistle-blowing that take place in politically-connected firms. Politics 
or political intervention in the aftermath of whistle-blowing often give rise to conflict of interest between whistle-blowers, 
managers, firm owners and politicians connected to the firm. If the management of politically-connected firms have the 
full support of firm owners and politicians connected to the firm, whistle-blowing against top-management fraud may not 
yield the intended outcomes expected by corporate whistle-blowers. In fact, while whistle-blowers may be satisfied that 
they have fulfilled their moral responsibility to expose falsehood at any corporate level, politicians connected to the firm 
can become angry because their political ambitions may be at risk due to fraud revelation of firms they are affiliated with. 
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Also, firm owners may become angry with whistle-blowers because of the loss of firm reputation due to fraud-related 
whistle blowing. Taken together, the political ambitions of politicians connected to the firm, the reputation concerns of firm 
owners and the career concerns of top management of the firm often combine to produce specific actions or reactions 
that either (i) compel top management to accept the fraud allegation(s) and discipline the fraudster in politically connected 
firms; or (ii) may produce specific actions that downplay fraud allegations made by whistle-blowers in politically-connected 
firms. If an employee blows the whistle to an external body or industry regulator, the management of the firm and 
politicians connected to the firm can team up to lobby the legal and judicial process in order to drop the fraud allegation 
made against the firm, and the way such lobbying play out will differ across firms in several countries. The main point 
here is that the lobby activities of politically-connected firms backed by political incentives can play a significant role on 
the outcome of whistle-blowing against fraud in politically-connected firms. 
However, the extent to which politically-connected firms can take actions to either thoroughly investigate or 
discipline fraudsters or to lobby the legal and judicial process to drop fraud allegations against it will depend on the 
strength of a country’s political economy and its institutions. By political economy, I mean the political process through 
which decisions are made by self-interested agents/politicians responding to political incentives to either protect their self-
interests or to improve the fight against corruption to ensure greater accountability in the public and private sector 
(Kaufman et al, 2011).3 Because the strength of a country’s political economy is strongly articulated by the enforcement 
quality of its political economy institutions responsible to fight corruption and improve accountability levels, politically-
connected firms in countries with strong political economy institutions will face more pressure to respond appropriately 
when fraudulent behavior in politically-connected firms is reported to external regulators. Politically-connected firms will 
face more pressure to act ethically to investigate reported fraud allegations, identify the fraudster(s) and discipline the 
fraudster(s) if the fraud allegation(s) made by whistle-blowing are true. On the other hand, a weak political economy 
environment create opportunities for politically-connected firms to downplay and deny claims made by external (or 
internal) whistle-blowing especially when the existing political economy and its institutions do not effectively tackle the 
issue corruption and accountability in the public and private sector. In such environments, potential whistle-blowers tend 
to have weak incentives to blow the whistle to report fraud for fear of being targets and victims of their own actions. In 
such countries, the incidence of whistle blowing tends to be very low even in a decade or more. Overall, the propensity 
for politically-connected firms to take fraud allegations seriously will be greater when they are in countries/environments 
with strong political economy (comprising of political economy institutions that strongly discourage corruption and require 
accountability in the public and private sector). 
Following the reasoning above, it is easy to understand how politics can interfere with whistle-blowing and a classic 
example that comes to mind is the case of Edward Snowden versus the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 2013, 
Edward Snowden blew the whistle against the CIA Corporation in the US. Documents leaked by Snowden revealed how 
the US spy program monitored the mobile phone communications of the US population and other foreign leaders without 
their consent. Snowden leaked the document because he was concerned that the CIA’s actions were unethical, illegal 
and unconstitutional at that time, and he felt it was his moral obligation to expose and report falsehood. In response, the 
US government responded and downplayed Snowden’s allegations by bringing legal charges of espionage against the 
whistle-blower - Edward Snowden (see, Wu et al, 2015 for more on this). The case of Edward Snowden shows how 
whistle-blowing outcomes can be altered through firm-level politics and political economy at country-level which is also 
driven by economic and/or political incentives. 
 
6. Firm Ownership Control and Whistle Blowing 
 
Corporate governance of firms can be viewed either in terms of the agency conflict between managers versus firms 
owners (Klein, 2002; Park and Shin, 2004), or in terms of the shared benefit of control versus private benefit of control in 
firms (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). This section focus on the latter. In firms where the conflict 
of interest is centered on controlling shareholders versus non-controlling shareholders, the incentive to blow the whistle 
against corporate fraud may be influenced by ownership control. In firms with large number of controlling/majority 
shareholders, potential whistle-blowers may have weak incentives to blow the whistle if they perceive that 
controlling/majority shareholders extract substantial amount of private benefits of control and reward managers in return 
                                                            
3 Clearly, there are substantial political economy differences across countries around the world and these differences may be correlated 
with corporate governance mechanisms in each country (Kaufman et al, 2011).  
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by protecting the career interest of managers in the firm. If the management team have the full support of controlling 
shareholders who receive private control benefits from managers4, controlling/majority shareholders can pressure board 
of directors to defend the career interest of accused managers if the manager is the accused fraudster following any 
incidence of fraud-related whistle-blowing, particularly, if the whistle-blowing is made within the organization. Controlling 
shareholders can use their influence to pressure the board of directors to resolve the fraud allegation internally within the 
organization without firing the accused individual(s) especially if the accused individual(s) are personally related to 
controlling shareholders. In some situations, controlling shareholders may immediately or later recommend the dismissal 
of the whistle-blower with a reward of severance payment. On the other hand, if a firm has a more disperse ownership 
structure, potential whistle-blowers may have stronger incentives to blow the whistle against fraud if they perceive that a 
coalition of minority (or non-controlling) shareholders can team up to pressure the board to fire the accused fraudster 
from the firm if their vote can outweigh the vote of the opposing coalition of shareholders that want to protect the career 
concern of the accused individuals (or accused manager). 
In reality, shareholders with similar interests in widely-held firms tend to form coalition groups to pressure the board 
to pursue their interests. Since no single shareholder can significantly influence the decisions of the board of directors in 
firms that are widely held, potential whistle-blowers tend to be more optimistic about the outcome of their whistle-blowing 
intentions with the hope that a coalition of shareholders will successfully pressure the board of directors to take 
disciplinary actions against the fraud perpetrator, including the need to fire the accused individual(s). However, if the 
opposing coalition-shareholder group succeed to persuade the board to take action against fraud but not to fire the 
accused individuals, the whistle-blower is to likely face retaliation in the near future and may be dismissed from the firm 
because of the reputation cost to the company arising from such whistle-blowing. Overall, this suggests that even if a 
company has a unit/department that deals with whistle-blowing and fraud-related issues, the ownership control of the firm 
can have a significant influence on the outcome of whistle-blowing activities in firms and can affect the career prospects 
of the whistle-blower in the firm they belong to. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Whistle-blowing is important to fraud detection activities. Whistle-blowing can help regulators and firms to save 
substantial resources that would otherwise go into fraud investigation if whistle-blowers emerge early enough and quite 
often. The tradeoff between the cost and benefit of whistle-blowing may compel the whistle-blower to apply some degree 
of conservatism in their whistle-blowing activities. Also, politics at firm-level and country-level may also influence the 
whistle-blowing culture in a country at a particular time. Despite the provision of financial incentive to blow the whistle, 
whistle-blowers that take into account the larger context of the whistle-blowing environment may find weaker or stronger 
incentives to blow the whistle. Furthermore, we show that the incentive to blow the whistle can be influenced by the 
ownership control between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. Finally, this study provides some theoretical 
explanations on the influence of conservatism, politics and ownership control on whistle-blowing. The limitation of the 
study is the lack of data to empirically test the argument in this paper. This limitation also create opportunities for future 
studies to empirically examine the influence of conservatism, political economy and ownership control on whistle-blowing. 
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